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Summary
We analyze how a sales tax levied on all food products impacts the consump-
tion of healthy food, unhealthy food, and obesity. The sales tax can stimulate the
consumption of healthy meals by lowering the time costs of food preparation.
Moreover, the sales tax lowers obesity under more general conditions than a tax
on unhealthy food (fat tax) and a subsidy on healthy food (thin subsidy). We cal-
ibrate the model using recent consumption and time use data from the US. The
thin subsidy is counterproductive and increases weight. While both the sales tax
and the fat tax mitigate obesity, the former imposes a lower excess burden on
consumers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many countries tax unhealthy foods to address the obesity epidemic: Chile, France, Ireland, Mexico, and the UK among
others tax sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), Finland taxes sweets and non-alcoholic beverages, while Hungary taxes
food products with health risks.
However, these policies may be ineffective or even counterproductive in reducing obesity, as consumers may substi-
tute to untaxed unhealthy food alternatives (Schroeter, Lusk, & Tyner, 2008). To minimize this problem, governments
can broaden the tax base (Finkelstein, Zhen, Nonnemaker, & Todd, 2010; Harding & Lovenheim, 2017; Miao, Beghin, &
Jensen, 2013). Therefore, nutrient taxes (such as a sugar tax or a fat tax) are more effective than product taxes (such as a
tax on SSBs).
This article is the first to propose a sales tax on all food products as an instrument that promotes healthy diets. A sales
tax may stimulate healthy consumption by lowering the opportunity cost of cooking time. Moreover, a sales tax imposes
a low excess burden on consumers, measured both per kcal reduction in consumption and per dollar of tax revenues.
We model a representative consumer in a model akin to that of Yaniv, Rosin, and Tobol (2009) and take explicitly
into account the higher opportunity cost in terms of time of healthy consumption. The individual chooses between
consumption of healthy and unhealthy food and has a fixed out-of-work time constraint, which she can spend on
cooking meals and leisure. The individual consumes unhealthy meals away-from-home (defined as food prepared
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original work is properly cited.
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away-from-home), and their preparation is not time-consuming. Healthy food is produced at home using both time and
ingredients.
We show that the sales tax lowers the opportunity cost of time in food preparation and may thus stimulate healthy
consumption. If the elasticity of substitution between healthy and unhealthy food is sufficiently high, the sales tax exerts
a positive effect on the demand for healthy meals. A tax on unhealthy foods (called for simplicity a fat tax) and a subsidy
to healthy consumption (called a thin subsidy) have qualitatively similar effects on the demand for healthy and unhealthy
food. Moreover, we show that the policy, which reduces obesity under the least restrictive conditions, is a positive sales
tax in the absence of a fat tax and a thin subsidy.
Ourmodel builds on the empirical observation that home-cookedmeals are healthier than away-from-home food. Com-
pared to the consumption of away-from-home meals, intake of home-cooked food is associated with higher intake of
fiber, iron, and calcium; lower intake of fat, sodium, and cholesterol; lower calorie density (Guthrie, Lin, & Frazao, 2002;
Lin & Frazao, 1997; Lin & Frazao, 1999) and lower weight (Chou, Grossman, & Saffer, 2004; French, Harnack, & Jeffery,
2000). Furthermore, a higher frequency of food preparation raises the consumption of fruits and vegetables and lowers
the intake of fat, SSBs and fast-food (Larson, Perry, Story, & Neumark-Sztainer, 2006; Laska, Larson, Neumark-Sztainer,
& Story, 2012; McLaughlin, Tarasuk, & Kreiger, 2003; Monsivais, Aggarwal, & Drewnowski, 2014; Wolfson & Bleich,
2015b). The positive dietary impact of frequent cooking occurs irrespectively of the weight-loss intentions of individu-
als (Wolfson & Bleich, 2015a). Kolodinsky and Goldstein (2011) estimate that ten additional minutes of cooking time
lower BMI by 0.13 points. Zick, Stevens, and Bryant (2011) find that ten minutes food preparation lower the BMI of
women by 0.17 points and do not affect the BMI of men, who, however, are a small share of the meal preparers in
their data.
In Section 4, we calibrate the model according to recent U.S. consumption and time allocation data. We estimate the
home production function, the dietary characteristics of at-home- and away-from-home-food and the time allocation
decisions such that they match data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 2009-2010
(CDC, 2010) and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 2010 (BLS, 2010). The simulated model makes predictions
regarding the own- and cross-price elasticities of healthy and unhealthy food that match existing empirical data on these
elasticities.
We find in the benchmark case of our simulation that a 10% sales tax lowers away-from-home consumption of men and
women by 7.9% and 4.8%, respectively. On the other hand, men's at-home consumption declines by just 0.01% and that
of women rises by 0.01%. Hence, the intake of at-home food remains almost unaffected. As a result, men lose 4% of their
weight andwomen 1.8%. On the other hand, a 10% fat tax induces a stronger substitution of at-home for away-from-home
consumption. Consequently, it leads to a lower weight decrease. Moreover, the excess burden of the sales tax, measured
using the compensating variation, is lower than that of the fat tax, irrespective of whether we calculate the excess burden
as the welfare loss per dollar of tax revenues or per reduction in calorie intake. Furthermore, the sales tax's excess burden
is also small in absolute value. It equals around 1 − 1.7 cents per dollar of tax revenues and 2 − 2.9 cents per 100 kcal
reduction in consumption. Lastly, an introduction of a thin subsidy stimulates strong substitution of healthy for unhealthy
food, such that weight slightly increases following the subsidy's implementation.
The article from Yaniv et al. (2009) is most related to our paper. They analyze the fat tax and thin subsidy under consid-
eration of the time costs of home-food preparation. Neither policy instrument is unambiguously obesity-reducing because
of indeterminate substitution effects on away-from-home food consumption and physical activity.
Bishai (2015) considers the welfare implications of a tax plus subsidy system that raises (lowers) the price of
unhealthy (healthy) nutrients but leaves the final product prices unchanged. He shows that such a system may improve
welfare.
There is strong empirical evidence that a fat tax does not necessarily reduce weight, because of a possible switch to
untaxed alternatives (Chouinard, Davis, LaFrance, & Perloff, 2007; Fletcher, Frisvold, &Tefft, 2010b; Schroeter et al., 2008;
Zhen, Finkelstein, Nonnemaker, Karns, & Todd, 2014). Schroeter et al. (2008) estimate that a tax on food-away-from-home
and a subsidy on fruit and vegetables may increase obesity. Zhen et al. (2014) show that a tax on SSBs can reduce their
consumption at the cost of higher intake of fat and sodium. Furthermore, Fletcher, Frisvold, and Tefft (2010a),Fletcher
et al. (2010b) find empirical support that such taxes have a significant effect on SSB consumption, but an insignifi-
cant effect on weight. Jeffery, French, Raether, and Baxter (1994) and French et al. (1997) find a significant short-term
impact of subsidizing fruits and salads at university and high school cafeteria, which vanishes after the removal of the
subsidy.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and solves for the optimal con-
sumption mix and time allocation of the representative individual. Section 3 determines the impacts of the fat tax,
the thin subsidy and the sales tax on away-from-home and at-home food consumption, and obesity and compares
them. In Section 4 we calibrate the model, while Section 5 discusses the policy implications of the results and concludes.
2 THE MODEL
We consider a one-periodmodel of obesity similar to the framework developed by Yaniv et al. (2009) The representative
agent is overweight and may consume either healthy meals H, or unhealthy (away-from-home) meals F.2 The calorie
intake per meal is denoted by 𝛿 and 𝜀 for unhealthy and healthy food, respectively. Furthermore, we impose 𝛿 > 𝜀, i.e.,
away-from-home food has more calories per meal (a meal is defined as the food consumed on one eating occasion).
The individual burns calories while at rest , which is due to the functioning of the body and is measured by the
basal metabolic rate (BMR). We denote the weight gain in the period as S and use it as a measure of obesity. It is
given by
S = 𝜉 (𝛿F + 𝜀H − BMR) , (1)
where 𝜉 > 0 is a parameter that converts calorie intake in the corresponding weight change.
The individual purchases unhealthy meals at a restaurant. Thus, their preparation does not require time. On the other
hand, healthy meals are prepared at home and require healthy ingredients and time.
Denote the healthy ingredients and time spent cooking by G and k, respectively. We characterize the production of H
by the following Leontief production function:
H(G, k) = min
{
G
𝛼
,
k
𝛽
}
, (2)
where 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 > 0 determine the quantity of ingredients and time needed to prepare a healthy meal.3
Furthermore, the away-from-homemeals F and the healthy ingredientsG are produced under perfect competition, and
their net prices equal the constant marginal costs of production pF and pG, respectively. Their gross prices are given by
p̃F ≡ pF(1 + 𝜏C + 𝜏F) and p̃G ≡ pG(1 + 𝜏C − 𝜎), respectively, where 𝜏C > 0 denotes a sales tax, which applies to all food
products, 𝜏F > 0 is a fat tax levied on unhealthy food, and 𝜎 > 0 is a thin subsidy on the healthy ingredients. The individual
also purchases a composite goodZwith a gross price normalized to equal one. She has an exogenous income I and receives
her tax payments back from the government in the form of a lump-sum transfer TR = (𝜏C + 𝜏F)pFF+(𝜏C −𝜎)pGG. Hence,
the budget constraint is given by
p̃FF + p̃GG + Z = I + TR. (3)
The out-of-work time of the individual is constant and equals T hours. She divides it among time devoted to food
preparation k and genuine leisure 𝓁. Thus, the time constraint is given by
k + 𝓁 = T. (4)
The individual derives utility from the total meal consumption C, which is a CES basket of home-cooked and
away-from-home meals
C = (aH𝜌 + (1 − a)F𝜌)
1
𝜌 , (5)
where a ∈ [0, 1] determines the weight of home-prepared meals and 𝜖C = 1∕(1 − 𝜌) ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between H and F. Furthermore, genuine leisure 𝓁 is the only welfare-enhancing allocation of time, while time spent
cooking k does not give direct utility benefits. Thus, utility is given by
U(C,𝓁,Z) = C1−𝜂𝓁𝜂 + V(Z), 𝜂 ∈]0, 1[, (6)
2The focus on an overweight individual does not affect the results. It is, however, important for their interpretation, as policies beneficial to overweight
consumers may be detrimental to under- and normalweight individuals.
3The assumption of a Leontief production function does not affect qualitatively the results. In Appendix C, we replace the Leontief function by a CES
production function. The main results remain unchanged.
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where VZ > 0 ≥ VZZ.
Due to our focus on an obese individual, a positive weight gain S(F,H) has negative health consequences. We define
the net utility of the individual as
NetU = U(C,𝓁,Z) − bS(F,H), b ≥ 0, (7)
where bS(F,H) is a proxy for the health problems associated with weight gain. Alternatively, one can interpret the param-
eter b as the weight that the consumer pon health in her objective function. Higher values of b denote a greater degree
of weight consciousness of the individual. The consumer makes optimal consumption and time allocation choices to
maximize Equation 7.
Before we solve the utility maximization problem, we derive the price of time, which is an important determinant of
the demand for home-prepared meals.
2.1 Opportunity Cost of Time
To derive the price of time, we consolidate the two constraints. First, we use the constant returns property of aggregate
consumption C to express it as C = CHH + CFF and replace F in Equation 3 by F = (C − CHH)∕CF , where Ci, i = H,F
denotes a partial derivative. Furthermore, we express G as 𝛼H. Lastly, we use the time constraint to rewrite H as H =
k∕𝛽 = (T − 𝓁)∕𝛽. Thus, we can rewrite Equation 3 as
p̃F
CF
C + 1
𝛽
(
CH
CF
p̃F − 𝛼p̃G
)
𝓁 + Z = I + TR + 1
𝛽
(
CH
CF
p̃F − 𝛼p̃G
)
T. (8)
The integrated budget constraint (8) presents the total expenditures in terms of spending on aggregate food consump-
tion, leisure, and the composite good. Total income is composed of the exogenous income I, the transfer TR and the
monetary value of the time endowmentT. The term in front of𝓁 gives the relative price of time in terms of the numéraireZ
and represents its opportunity cost. If 𝓁 goes up, then the time available for cooking declines, which lowers the consump-
tion of healthy mealsH by a factor 1∕𝛽. This effect saves payments on healthy ingredients amounting to 𝛼p̃G∕𝛽. However,
the individual needs more away-from-home food to consume a given amount of C and, thus, additional payments equal
to (CH∕CF)p̃F∕𝛽 arise. Hence, the opportunity cost of time is (CHp̃F∕CF − 𝛼p̃G)∕𝛽. We assume CHp̃F∕CF > 𝛼p̃G, which
guarantees a positive price of leisure and an interior solution to the utility maximization problem.
2.2 Optimal Consumption and Time Allocation
The consumer maximizes the utility function (7) with respect to healthy consumptionH and unhealthy food F subject to
the time and budget constraints.
We simplify the utility maximization problem by expressing leisure 𝓁 and the expenditures on Z as functions of H and
F. Solving the budget constraint for Z and using G = 𝛼H, we get
Z = I + TR − p̃FF − p̃G𝛼H. (9)
Using the production function for healthy meals (2), we can rewrite the time spent cooking as k = 𝛽H, which together
with the time constraint (4) gives
𝓁 = T − 𝛽H. (10)
Hence, we can express the consumer's problem as the maximization of the net utility function (7) over healthy meals
H and unhealthy meals F subject to the constraints (1), (5), (9), and (10). The first-order conditions are given by
𝜕NetU
𝜕H = UCCH − U𝓁𝛽 − VZp̃G𝛼 − b𝜉𝜀 = 0, (11)
𝜕NetU
𝜕F = UCCF − VZp̃F − b𝜉𝛿 = 0. (12)
Equation 12 shows that healthy consumption has four effects on net utility. First, an increase in H raises aggregate
consumption C and, thus, utility at the rateUCCH . Second, its preparation requires time, such that time devoted to leisure
declines and lowers utility according to the term −U𝓁𝛽. Third, the preparation of H also requires ingredients G which
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lowers the spending on the composite good. This effect reduces utility by the amountVZp̃G𝛼. Lastly,H raises weight at the
rate 𝜉𝜀,which lowers utility, if the individual is weight-conscious (b > 0). The interpretation of Equation (12) is analogous.
3 TAXES AND OBESITY
The impact of the tax rates on the demand for H depends not only on their effect on the price of ingredients G but also
on the price of cooking time k which is the opportunity cost of foregone leisure. Therefore, a derivation of the policy
instruments' effects on the price of leisure is crucial for the understanding of their effects on consumption. Denote the
relative price of leisure from Equation 8 as 𝜋. Taking the partial derivatives of 𝜋 with respect to 𝜏F , 𝜏C, and 𝜎, we get
𝜋𝜏F =
CHpF
𝛽CF
> 0, (13a)
𝜋𝜎 =
𝛼pG
𝛽
> 0, (13b)
𝜋𝜏C =
1
𝛽
(
CH
CF
pF − 𝛼pG
)
> 0, if 𝜏F = 𝜎 = 0. (13c)
According to Equations (13a) and (13b), the fat tax and the thin subsidy have a positive effect on the price of leisure. Both
𝜏F and 𝜎 increase the additional expenditures on F that are necessary in order to keep aggregate consumption constant
following an increase in leisure time. Hence, they raise the opportunity cost of leisure. A sales tax has the same impact
in the absence of a fat tax or a thin subsidy. In this case, the effect of a sales tax is proportional to the price of leisure, i.e.
𝜋𝜏C (𝜏F = 𝜎 = 0) = 𝜋∕(1 + 𝜏C).
Consider now the effects of the policy instruments on F∗ andH∗, where a superscript ∗ denotes the optimal values. We
derive these effects by totally differentiating the first-order conditions (11) and (12) with respect to H,F, and the policy
parameters. In Appendix A we derive the following results:
Proposition 1.
(i) An increase in the fat tax 𝜏F lowers away-from-home consumption F∗. There exists an elasticity of substitution
𝜖C > 0, such that a rise in the fat tax raises healthy consumption H∗ if 𝜖C > 𝜖C, and lowers it if 𝜖C < 𝜖C.
(ii) An increase in the thin subsidy 𝜎 raises healthy consumptionH∗. A rise in the thin subsidy lowers away-from-home
consumption F∗ if 𝜖C > 𝜖C, and raises it if 𝜖C < 𝜖C.
(iii) In the absence of a fat tax and a thin subsidy, an increase in the sales tax 𝜏C lowers away-from-home consumption
F∗. There exists an elasticity of substitution 𝜖C > 0, such that a rise in the sales tax raises healthy consumption H∗
if 𝜖C > 𝜖C, and lowers it if 𝜖C < 𝜖C.
Proof. See Appendix A.
First, we interpret the effects of the introduction of a fat tax. It imposes three different effects on the demand forH and
F. First, it raises themonetary price of away-from-home consumption F relative to at-home foodH. Hence, the individual
substitutes H for F in order to consume cost-effectively, i.e., to achieve a higher consumption C per one dollar spent on
food. Second, 𝜏F increases the price of leisure according to Equation (13c). Thus, it lowers the opportunity cost of cooking
time and stimulates food preparation H∗. Third, aggregate consumption C becomes more expensive relative to non-food
products, i.e., there is a negative substitution effect on C, which lowers the demand for both H and F. If the two types of
meals are not too complementary, i.e., if the elasticity of substitution betweenH and F is high enough (𝜖C > 𝜖C), thenH∗
goes up despite the decline in aggregate consumption C. On the other hand, if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently
close to zero, the decrease in C requires that both F and H go down.
A thin subsidy also leads to substitution of H for F due to the change in their relative price. Moreover, it stimulates
healthy consumption by lowering the opportunity cost of cooking time according to Equation (13b). However, it also
lowers the price of aggregate consumption C relative to the composite good Z. Thus, it imposes a positive substitution
effect on C which raises both at- and away-from-home food demand. While all three effects increase the demand for H,
357
KALAMOV
away-from-home consumption may increase or decline. If the food basket exhibits sufficiently high elasticity of substi-
tution (𝜖C > 𝜖C), then F∗ goes down. On the other hand, if H and F are sufficiently complementary, then unhealthy
consumption also goes up.
Lastly, the sales tax works qualitatively in the same way as the fat tax. It imposes negative substitution effects on leisure
𝓁 and consumptionC. While the first effect stimulatesH and lowers the demand for F, the latter effect impacts negatively
both at- and away-from-home consumption. If H and F are sufficiently substitutable in the basket of goods C, i.e., if
𝜖C > 𝜖C, the consumption of home-cooked meals is an increasing function of the sales tax.
Proposition 1 is derived under the assumption that the tax revenues are returned to the consumer, and, thus, there are
no income effects. It is straightforward to analyze the potential impact of income effects in the absence of the transfer TR.
If both leisure 𝓁 and consumption C are normal goods, then a higher tax 𝜏F or 𝜏C lowers income and imposes negative
income effects. LowerCwould tend to decrease the demand for bothH and F, while the negative impact on leisure works
in the same direction as the substitution effect on leisure: it stimulates home production H. Therefore, both 𝜏F and 𝜏C
impose a negative income effect on away-from-home consumption F and an ambiguous income effect on H. Thus, parts
(i) and (iii) of Proposition 1 remain qualitatively unchanged. Moreover, a subsidy 𝜎 imposes a positive income effect on
bothC and 𝓁, which unambiguously stimulates away-from-home demand andmay increase or lower demand for at-home
meals. Thus, in the presence of income effects, 𝜎 has ambiguous effects on both H∗ and F∗.
Next, we consider how the taxes affect obesity. If the change in one policy instrument induces consumers to substitute
H for F, then the impact on weight may be minimal or even positive. We derive the following results:
Proposition 2.
(i) An increase in the fat tax 𝜏F lowers obesity if 𝛿(CH +C𝛽∕𝓁) > 𝜀CF and 𝛿𝛼pG > 𝜀pF. Otherwise, its effect on obesity
is ambiguous.
(ii) An increase in the thin subsidy 𝜎 lowers obesity if 𝛿(CH + C𝛽∕𝓁) > 𝜀CF , 𝛿𝛼pG > 𝜀pF, and 𝜖C → ∞. Otherwise, its
effect on obesity is ambiguous.
(iii) An increase in the sales tax 𝜏C in the absence of a fat tax and a thin subsidy lowers obesity if 𝛿(CH +C𝛽∕𝓁) > 𝜀CF.
Otherwise, its effect on obesity is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Each policy parameter mitigates obesity if it lowers the net calorie intake. First, we interpret the effect of the sales tax
on obesity. It is negative if 𝛿(CH+C𝛽∕𝓁) > 𝜀CF . This condition states that the reduction in away-from-home consumption
lowers obesity (at a rate 𝛿) bymore than a (possible) increase inH raises it (at a rate 𝜀). It derives from the specific relation
in which at- and away-from-home food must be consumed for the individual to achieve her optimal consumption-leisure
choice. To understand this condition, consider without loss of generality the case where H and F are perfect substitutes
(i.e., 𝜌 = 1), such that CH = a and CF = (1 − a). Using the definition of the consumption bundle C in (5), we get
dC∗
d𝜏C
= CH
dH∗
d𝜏C
+ CF
dF∗
d𝜏F
. (14)
Now use the first-order conditions (11) and (12) to derive the optimal consumption-leisure choice:
U𝓁
UC
= CFp̃F
𝜋 +
b𝜉(𝛿𝛼p̃G − 𝜀p̃F)
UC𝛽p̃F
. (15)
This equation states that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure 𝓁 and consumption C equals the sum of the
relativemonetary price of leisure, 𝜋∕(p̃F∕CF), and themarginal change in utility due to the effect of a substitution between
leisure and consumption on weight. In the absence of a fat tax and a thin subsidy, the terms containing the sales tax in
(15) cancel out. Hence, the sales tax vanishes from the above equation. Since both marginal utilities UC and U𝓁 depend
only on the ratio C∕𝓁, we conclude that C∕𝓁 must be independent of the sales tax 𝜏C (in the absence of other taxes). This
results translates in dC∗∕d𝜏C = (C∕𝓁)d𝓁∗∕d𝜏C. Using this expression together with d𝓁∗ = −dk∗ = −dH∗∕𝛽 and (14), we
get
CF
dF∗
d𝜏C
= −
(
CH + 𝛽
C
𝓁
) dH∗
d𝜏C
. (16)
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Hence, the reduction in F is proportional to the increase in at-home consumptionH. Moreover, a reduction in F lowers
weight at a rate 𝛿, while an increase in H raises it at a rate 𝜀 according to dS = 𝛿dF∗ + 𝜀dH∗. Combining this expression
with (16) gives the condition 𝛿(CH + C𝛽∕𝓁) > 𝜀CF for a reduction in obesity. While in the special case 𝜌 = 1 this is a
necessary condition, when 𝜌 < 1 it is only a sufficient condition (as imperfect substitutability unabiguously lowers both
dH∗ and dF∗).
Consider now 𝜏F and 𝜎. Both policy instruments may impact the weight gain S negatively if 𝛿(CH+C𝛽∕𝓁) > 𝜀CF for the
same reason as the sales tax. However, they also change themonetary price of F relative toH which leads to a substitution
from F to H. The weight gain is a declining function of this relative price if 𝛿𝛼pG > 𝜀pF . Obesity declines following
an increase in the fat tax if both conditions are satisfied, while the thin subsidy requires additionally a sufficiently high
elasticity of substitution to affect weight negatively. Therefore, we conclude that the sales tax lowers obesity under more
general conditions than the fat tax and the thin subsidy.
3.1 The Government
In this section, we motivate the government's objective of addressing obesity and the criterion we use for the choice of a
tax rate. There are two motivations in the literature for the introduction of policies against obesity. First, obesity imposes
an externality on society because health insurance companies bear most of the costs of treating obesity-related illnesses
(Cawley & Meyerhoefer, 2012). Second, individuals may suffer from self-control problems and develop eating habits that
they regret later. Such individuals do not fully take into account the obesity-related health costs and impose an internality
on their future selves (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2006).
Suppose the government aims to internalize either the externality or the internality of obesity or both. Itmust choose the
most appropriate instrument. Following Miao et al. (2013),Harding and Lovenheim (2017), we assume that the govern-
ment's objective is to choose the tax instrument that lowers obesity at the lowest welfare loss for consumers.  Therefore,4
our next step is to compare the three tax instruments according to their welfare costs. Unfortunately, a comparison of
these costs is intractable in the theoretical model. To gain more intuition regarding their effects, we calibrate the model
in the next section.
4 CALIBRATION
We calibrate the model so that it fits consumption and time use data from the US during 2009-2010. We simulate the
model separately for men and women, as they differ in both their dietary and time allocation choices.
In this section, we assume that utility derived from the consumption of the composite good Z is logarithmic, i.e.,V(Z) =
ln(Z). Furthermore, we follow Buttet and Dolar (2015) and assume that the basal metabolic rate BMR is a linear function
of weight
BMRi = 𝜈i0 + 𝜈i1Wi, (17)
where the index i = m, 𝑓 denotes the gender of the individual (male or female), 𝜈i0 > 0, 𝜈i1 > 0 are constants, and Wi
represents weight.
4.1 Data
We use the survey data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 2009-2010 (CDC, 2010).
NHANES is a program of the National Center for Health Statistics and uses interviews and physical examinations to
determine the health andnutritional status of theUSpopulation.NHANESprovides dietary data that includes the number
of meals consumed at home H, away-from-home F, the quantity of ingredients G, and calories per meal (𝜀 and 𝛿 in our
model). We report this data in Table 1. Per day the average male (female) has 3.76 (4.08) eating occasions at home and
1.79 (1.56) away-from-home. The calories per meal 𝜀 and 𝛿 appear in Panel B of Table 1. The reported estimates confirm
our initial assumption that away-from-home food is more calorie-dense, i.e., 𝛿i > 𝜀i.5 Figure E.1 in Appendix E plots the
values of 𝛿i and 𝜀i with 95% confidence intervals, while Figures E.2-E.4 present the same values for different BMI, age,
and income groups. The differential 𝛿i − 𝜀i remains positive in all sub-groups but loses significance in some of them.
4Miao et al. (2013) compare two nutrient taxes: on added sugars and solid fat. Harding and Lovenheim (2017) consider different product and nutrient
taxes.
5A Wald test rejects the Null hypothesis 𝛿i = 𝜀i with p-values < 0.0001 for both genders.
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When looking at the BMI sub-populations, the difference between the kcal per meal is largest for the overweight and
obese individuals, and smaller for the under- and normalweight. The next parameter in Panel B is the multiplier 𝜉 that
translates calorie intake in weight change. Hall, Guo, Dore, and Chow (2009) estimate that a weight gain of 10 kg is
associated with a rise in consumption of around 220 kcal/day above what is needed to maintain an individual's current
weight. Thus, we set 𝜉 = 10∕220 ≈ 0.045 kg/kcal/day. In addition, Panel B reports two parameters that are not part of
the calibration but are nevertheless important for an assessment of the healthiness of different meals: added sugar and
saturated fat per meal consumed at- and away-from-home. Both are significantly larger in away-from-home food. The
weights of the representative male and female individuals are reported in Panel C of Table 1 and come from the NHANES
survey 2009-2010. To calculate the BMR parameters, we use data from Trumbo, Schlicker, Yates, and Poos (2002) who
find that men need additional 15.91 kcal per extra kg to maintain a constant weight, while this parameter is 9.36 kcal
per extra kg for women. Therefore, we choose 𝜈m1 = 15.91, 𝜈
𝑓
1 = 9.36. We set the value of the parameter 𝜈i0 such that the
representative consumer has a steady state weight, i.e., the weight change Si is zero:
Si = 0 = 𝜉(𝛿iFi + 𝜀iHi − 𝜈i0 − 𝜈i1Wi), i = m, 𝑓 .
The resulting values for 𝜈i0 are reported in Table 1.
We use time allocation data from the 2010 American Time Use Survey (ATUS) conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS, 2010). It provides nationally representative estimates of the time use of the U.S. population. Panel D of
Table 1 reports the time use data. Cooking time k refers to the ATUS category “food preparation and cleanup", while
leisure time 𝓁 refers to the category “leisure and sports" and includes socializing, relaxing, leisure, attending sporting
events and exercising. We estimate the total out-of-work time T as the sum of the cooking and leisure time.6
In Panel E of Table 1 we estimate the parameters of the home production function for each gender such that they satisfy
the dietary and time use data from panels A and D.
Next, we turn to the estimation of the gross food prices p̃G and p̃F . We derive them in two steps. First, we follow
the approach of Buttet and Dolar (2015) for estimation of the price per calorie for at-home consumption p̃G𝛼∕𝜀 and for
away-from-home consumption p̃F∕𝛿. The second step consists in using the mean values for 𝛼, 𝜀 and 𝛿 to derive the gross
prices. Buttet and Dolar (2015) use the following expression to define the per calorie prices:
Price per caloriei =
Per capita daily expenditures for food i
Per capita daily calories produced of food i , i = H,F. (18)
The data used in the estimation of Eq. 18 is presented in Table 2. We derive the prices for the year 2010. We calculate
the per-capita daily spending on the food of type i by multiplying the expenditure share of type i (provided by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture Food Expenditure Series USDA/ERS, 2010b) by the per-capita daily income I = $97.76 (BEA,
2010). To estimate the produced calories of food of type i, we use the total per-capita calorie production per day in 2010
which amounts to 2481 kcal (USDA/ERS, 2010a). We allocate it to each type of food according to their shares in calorie
consumption. We report the resulting prices in Table 2.
Wenowhave all the necessary parameters for the estimation of themodel except for the preference parametersa, 𝜖C, 𝜂, b.
There are several estimates of the elasticity of substitution 𝜖C. While an early study of Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright
(1991) finds 𝜖C = 5, Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis (2011) report that 𝜖C = 2.5 can best explain the allocation of
time of U.S. households. Karabarbounis (2014) finds 𝜖C = 3.9, while estimates by Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (1995),
McGrattan, Rogerson, andWright (1997), Chang and Schorfheide (2003) are in the range between 1.8 and 2.3. Therefore,
it is plausible to assume that the actual elasticity of substitution is in the interval [2, 5]. In the benchmark model, we use
the estimate of Karabarbounis (2014) (see Panel A of Table 3).  Moreover, Karabarbounis (2014) estimates the share of7
home-produced goods in the basket C to be equal to approximately two-thirds, and we set a = 0.67.
6Note that the total out-of-work time T is larger for men than it is for women. The reason is that the two genders allocate their time differently to other
uses. Whether and how the taxes considered in this paper affect other time uses (such as, e.g., the labor supply) is beyond the scope of this paper and
left for future research.
7All of the cited studies estimate 𝜖C as the elasticity of substitution between home- and market-produced goods and are, thus, more general than the
definition of 𝜖C in our model. Because the elasticity of substitution between at-home and away-from-home food may differ from the general elasticity,
we perform robustness checks in Appendix D for 𝜖C = 2 and 𝜖C = 5, i.e., the high- and low-estimates in the literature. Our results remain qualitatively
unchanged.
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Male Female
A. Dietary Dataa
H: 3.76 (0.054) 4.08 (0.059)
F: 1.79 (0.044) 1.56 (0.056)
G in thousand grams: 2.59 (0.05) 2.17 (0.039)
B. Dietary Parametersb
𝜀: 467 (7.80) 326 (5.27)
𝛿: 561 (14.02) 400 (12.73)
𝜉: 0.045 0.045
added sugar in grams/meal (H): 14.23 (0.46) 11.06 (0.29)
added sugar in grams/meal (F): 21.48 (0.92) 15.61 (0.78)
saturated fat in grams/meal (H): 8.34 (0.27) 5.73 (0.12)
saturated fat in grams/meal (F): 10.06 (0.47) 7.14 (0.33)
C. Weightaand BMR Parametersc
Weight in kg: 88.02 (0.63) 74.75 (0.38)
𝜈0: 1359.77 1254.69
𝜈1: 15.91 9.36
D. Time Use Datad
k in hours: 0.32 0.79
𝓁 in hours: 5.57 4.82
T in hours: 5.89 5.61
E. Food Preparation Parameterse
𝛼: 0.688 0.533
𝛽: 0.085 0.194
aSource: Author's calculations based on NHANES 2009 − 2010 (CDC, 2010).
bSources: 𝜀 and 𝛿 from author's calculations based on NHANES 2009 − 2010
(CDC, 2010), 𝜉 from Hall et al. (2009).
cSource: Trumbo et al. (2002) and author's calculations.
dSource: Bureau of Labor Statistics ATUS 2010 Table A-1 BLS (2010).
eSource: Author's calculations.
TABLE 1 Dietary data, weight, time use data and food
preparation parameters for U.S. adults age 15 years and older
(standard error in parenthesis)
To capture the different dietary and time allocation data for men and women, we allow for gender-specific values of
the share of leisure in the utility function 𝜂 and the degree of weight-consciousness b. We estimate these parameters by
inserting all parameters from Tables 1, 2 and Panel A of Table 3 in the first-order conditions (11) and (12) separately for
each gender. The values of 𝜂 and b that solve the first-order conditions are reported in Panel B of Table 3. Note that the8
parameter b is much higher for women than for men. One possible explanation for this result is that women are more
weight-conscious than men (see Parmenter, Waller, and Wardle (2000) for empirical evidence). Moreover, obese women
are more likely to have weight loss intentions than obese men (Assari & Lankarani, 2015). Furthermore, a higher b value
may also indicate additional health costs of being obese for women, such as higher probability of infertility (Silvestris, de
Pergola, Rosania, & Loverro, 2018) and higher risk of developing breast cancer (Picon-Ruiz, Morata-Tarifa, Valle-Goffin,
Friedman, & Slingerland, 2017).9 Moreover, obesity impacts negatively womens' wages but not mens' (Cawley, 2004).
However, one additional possible explanation for this result may be the choice to model the utility costs of obesity linearly
in the weight-gain. Since women weigh on average less, a given absolute weight gain translates in a larger relative change
for them and, thus, larger health costs.
Before we proceed to the effects of tax rate changes, we evaluate the suitability of our model for analyzing consumption
choices. We use the model to predict the own-price, and cross-price elasticities of H and F, as well as the elasticity of
non-food purchaseswith respect to food prices. The estimates areweighted averages of the elasticities formen andwomen,
where we use the gender shares in the consumption of each good as weights. We report them in the second column
of Table 4, where 𝜖i𝑗 , i = H,F,Z, 𝑗 = H,F denotes the elasticity of good i with respect to the price of food of type 𝑗.
These predictions are evaluated against recent elasticity estimates for the U.S. from Okrent and Alston (2012). Okrent
and Alston determine the elasticities separately for six food groups of type H, and we aggregate them according to the
expenditure shares of each group (see Appendix D for details). The aggregated estimates of Okrent and Alston (2012) are
8In the derivation of the parameters 𝜂 and b, we estimate the expenditures for the composite good as Zi = I − p̃GGi − p̃FFi, i = 𝑓,m.
9The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for this interpretation.
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TABLE 2 Income and price estimates Year 2010
A. Food Expenditures and Calorie Productiona
Daily real disposable income I (2009 dollars): $97.76
Expenditure Share H: 0.055
Expenditure Share F: 0.04
Calorie production: 2481
Calorie Share H: 0.668
Calorie Share F: 0.332
B. Price Estimatesb
Price per thousand kcal H (p̃G𝛼∕𝜀): 3.26
Price per thousand kcal F (p̃F∕𝛿): 4.77
p̃G: 2.12
p̃F : 2.29
aSources: Expenditure shares data from USDA Food Expenditure Series
(USDA/ERS, 2010b), income data from Bureau of Economic Analysis -
NIPA Table 2.1 Personal Income and its Disposition (BEA, 2010), calo-
rie production from USDA Food Availability Data System (USDA/ERS,
2010a), shares in calorie production from NHANES 2009 − 2010 (CDC,
2010).
bSource: Author's calculations.
TABLE 3 Preference parameters Male Female
A. Consumption BasketCa
𝜖C = 1∕(1 − 𝜌): 3.9 3.9
a: 0.67 0.67
B. Calibrated Parametersb
𝜂: 0.88 0.72
b: 1.99 × 10−3 6.89 × 10−3
aSource: Karabarbounis (2014).
bSource: Author's calculations.
TABLE 4 Evaluation of the model Empirical Dataa Model Predictionsb
Male Female Male Female
𝜖HH : −0.076 −0.134
𝜖HF : 0.24 0.14
𝜖FH : 0.29 0.16
𝜖FF : −0.71 −0.89
𝜖ZH : −0.16 −0.055
𝜖ZF : −0.06 −0.012
aSources: Expenditures shares data from USDA Food
Expenditure Series (USDA/ERS, 2010b), price elasticity
data from Okrent and Alston (2012).
bSource: Author's calculations.
reported in the first column of Table 4. The model's predictions both coincide in sign with the empirical data and are
very close in absolute values. Okrent and Alston (2012) find H to be highly inelastic (𝜖HH = −0.076), while the model
predicts 𝜖HH = −0.134. The own-price elasticities for F are also similar with 𝜖FF = −0.71 according to Okrent and Alston
(2012) and 𝜖FF = −0.89 from the model. Both the empirical estimates and the model report slightly positive cross-price
elasticities of the food products and slightly negative elasticities of non-food purchases with respect to both food prices.
Therefore, themodel matches the empirical observations that (i)H and F and gross substitutes and (ii) food and non-food
products are gross complements.
4.2 Evaluation of tax policy
In this section, we evaluate tax policy according to its impact on the consumption of healthy mealsH, unhealthy meals F,
weightW and excess burden EB. The weight change is measured as a percentage change relative to the initial weight, i.e.
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𝜏F = 10% 𝜎 = 10% 𝜏C = 10%
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Consumption, weight and utility effectsa:
%ΔF: −10.4 −5.77 −2.74 −1.04 −7.89 −4.78
%ΔH: 1.96 0.79 2.04 0.74 −0.014 0.005
%ΔW : −3.59 −1.54 0.42 0.2 −4.06 −1.75
CV ($/day): 0.39 0.35 −0.55 −0.46 0.94 0.81
EB∕TR: 0.057 0.03 0.01b 0.004b 0.017 0.01
EB∕kcal (cent/kcal): 0.03 0.04 −c −c 0.02 0.029
aSource: Author's calculations.
bExcess burden measured as a proportion of the absolute value of tax revenues.
cDue to the increase of calorie intake in this case, the excess burden per reduction in calorie intake is not defined.
TABLE 5 Simulation of the
tax policy effects on
consumption and weight
%ΔWi = Si∕Wi, i = 𝑓,m,where the initial weightWi is reported in Table 1. The welfare effect of taxation is measured by
the compensating variation (CV). We calculate the CV of a tax rate increase as the transfer that equates the after-tax net
utility of the consumer to its pre-tax level. Next, we compute the excess burden of taxation as EB = CV − TR. Then, we
compare the tax instruments according to two criteria: (i) excess burden per dollar of tax revenue and (ii) excess burden
per kcal reduction in consumption.
We report the results in Table 5. The first scenario considers a 10% fat tax. It results in a substantial decline in
away-from-home consumption (−5.77% for women and−10.4% formen) and an increase in at-home consumption (0.79%
for women and 1.96% formen). The latter effectmitigates the impact of the tax, and the overall weight reduction is−3.59%
for men and −1.54% for women. These weight losses amount to an absolute decline of 3.2 kg for men and 1.15 kg for
women. The compensating variation of this tax equals 0.39 $∕day (0.35 $∕day) for men and women, respectively.
On the other hand, a 10% subsidy 𝜎 leads to an almost identical increase in the number of healthy mealsH but a much
smaller reduction in the number of unhealthy meals F. As a result, the thin subsidy is counterproductive and increases
weight slightly. The thin subsidy creates a negative CV (utility gain). However, since this policy is counterproductive, we
view it as the worst alternative with respect to the objective of mitigating obesity. Nevertheless, the subsidy is likely to be
beneficial for underweight individuals, as well as for poor and undernourished individuals.
We report the impact of a 10% sales tax in the last two columns of Table 5. It results in an intermediate decline in F
(−7.89% for men and −4.78% for women) and leaves the number of healthy meals almost unchanged: the decline in Hm
amounts to 0.014%, while H𝑓 increases by 0.005%. Since the consumption of food-at-home does not change, this policy
results in themost substantial weight loss:−4.06% (3.57 kg) and−1.75% (1.31 kg) formen andwomen, respectively.While
the CV of this policy is higher than the CV of a fat tax, it is much more efficient in reducing weight. The excess burden of
𝜏C as a proportion of tax revenues is less than half of the same measure for the fat tax. The excess burden per kcal of the
sales tax is about two-thirds of the same deadweight loss measure for 𝜏F . Moreover, the excess burden of 𝜏C is very low in
absolute value. The sales tax imposes a deadweight loss of 1 − 1.7 cents per dollar of tax revenues and 2 − 2.9 cents per
100 kcal change in consumption.
As an extension, we consider a combination of the fat tax and the thin subsidy (see Table E.1 in Appendix E). The fat
tax equals 10% and the thin subsidy is chosen such that the system is self-financing and equals approximately 6.7%. In
calculating the revenue neutral tax reform,we assume equal proportions ofmale and female consumers. The combination
is more effective at lowering away-from-home consumption than any of the other scenarios but also results in the largest
increase in at-home consumption. The resulting weight changes are −3.2% for men and −1.4% for women. However, the
excess burden per kcal change in consumption is higher than in the case of a fat tax only. The reason for the high excess
burden is the fact that the strong substitution for at-home meals mitigates the impact of this scenario on weight.
According to Proposition 1, the effects of the policy instruments depend on the exact value of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between F and H. The results in Table 5 are derived under the assumption 𝜖C = 3.9. However, the empirical
estimates of the elasticity of substitution are in the range between 2 and 5. Therefore, in Appendix E we perform a
sensitivity analysis by considering both 𝜖C = 2 and 𝜖C = 5. The results remain qualitatively unchanged (see Table
E.2 Appendix E). Moreover, when 𝜖C = 5, the sales tax raises the consumption of home-prepared meals by 0.5% and
0.3% for men and women, respectively. Thus, the threshold value 𝜖C above which healthy consumption is increas-
ing in the sales tax is within the range of empirical estimates for 𝜖C. Additionally, Figures E.5 and E.6 plot the excess
burden per kcal reduction in consumption and per dollar of tax revenues for both the fat tax and the sales tax as
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functions of 𝜖C. The two figures show that as the degree of substitutability declines, the excess burden values get
nearer and intersect at 𝜖C values slightly above one. Hence, when the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, the
calibration predicts lower efficiency costs of the fat tax. Nevertheless, such values lie outside the range of empirical
estimates for 𝜖C.
As an additional robustness check, we compare the excess burden of the fat tax and the thin subsidy for different kcal
per meal values 𝜀i and 𝛿i in Figures E.7 and E.8.We let 𝜀i and 𝛿i vary simultaneously between the lower and upper bounds
of their 95% confidence intervals. The fat tax exerts higher excess burden than the sales tax for all combinations of 𝜀i and
𝛿i values.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has compared three different policy instruments, which can be used to address the problem of rising obesity
levels: a fat tax (levied on food-away-from-home), a thin subsidy (levied on groceries that enter home food preparation)
and a sales tax on all food items. First, we show that a sales tax may stimulate time-intensive healthy consumption by
lowering the opportunity cost of time spent on food preparation. Therefore, it may exert a positive effect on the demand
for healthy meals. If healthy and unhealthy meals are perfect substitutes, then all three policy instruments have the same
qualitative impact on the consumer's demand: they reduce the consumption of unhealthy meals and raise the consump-
tion of healthy food. Second, the policy which reduces obesity under the most general conditions is a sales tax in the
absence of the fat tax and the thin subsidy.
A calibration of the model shows that the sales tax mitigates obesity at the lowest welfare cost for consumers. Further-
more, the deadweight cost of the sales tax is small is absolute value. It imposes an excess burden of less than 2 cents per
dollar of tax revenues and 3 cents per 100 kcal reduction in the calorie-intake.
Our results open ample opportunities for future research. While this article extends the model of Yaniv et al. (2009) to
include a general elasticity of substitution between food at-home and away-from-home and the possibility of non-food
purchases, we do not consider the choice of physical exercise. Including it may produce further interesting results on the
effects of a sales tax.
Additionally, this article hightlights the role of the price of time in consumption choices. It explains the higher time
spent cooking by women through lower opportunity cost of leisure. Gender differences in the price of time are likely
caused by the gender wage gap, as documented by Zick et al. (2011). These authors use wage regressions from the March
Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and find the opportunity cost of time for men and women to be
20.57 $∕hour and 16.84 $∕hour, respectively. The gender wage gap is also likely to contribute to unequal distribution of
cooking time in non single-adult households. Moreover, closing of the gap is likely to affect this distribution. Hence, more
research is necessary to analyze how different opportunity costs of time and the elimination of these differences may
affect household production.
Moreover, future work should compare the sales tax to nutrient-specific taxes such as a tax on sugar or fat content. The
sales tax may be more efficient in promoting healthy diets as it targets several unhealthy nutrients at once by lowering
away-from-home consumption. Furthermore, a comparison to the tax plus subsidy system of Bishai (2015) along the same
lines is necessary.
This paper has contributed to the literature by emphasizing the time costs of healthy consumption and showing their
importance for the optimal policy design. Future research should focus on analyzing other policies that lower the oppor-
tunity cost of home food preparation or provide other incentives for cooking. Two public health programs that have
already been implemented in the US are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Healthy Incentives
Pilot which provides financial incentives for the purchase of fruits and vegetables and the Women, Infants, and Chil-
dren (WIC) Farmer's Market Nutrition program which issues coupons to participants to buy foods from farmers (Smith,
Ng, & Popkin, 2013). An evaluation of the effects of these programs on the participants' cooking habits is an important
research agenda.
Taxing all food products may be regressive, as poor households spend a larger proportion of their income on food
relative to rich households. As a result, an important agenda for future research is to quantify this effect and analyze how
governments should spend the tax receipts, such that the tax becomes less regressive. Additionally, it is well-known that
a fat tax is also regressive (see, e.g., Chouinard et al. (2007)). Therefore, future work should compare the regressivity of a
fat tax to that of a sales tax.
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